News & Events

“Can one person oversee every spy?” by Finlo Rohrer, BBC News (5/28/10)

“He has no power, no leverage. He can’t make anything happen. He doesn’t control anything of significance in the [intelligence] community,” says Mark Lowenthal, former deputy assistant secretary of state for intelligence and president of the Intelligence and Security Academy.

“He is just there to try and get people to listen to him and co-ordinate. He can’t. I think we have proved that to everyone’s satisfaction.”

…

There is a case for returning to the structure that existed before Mr Blair’s post was created, Mr Lowenthal suggests.

Then the job of co-ordinating the intelligence community fell to the director of central intelligence, who also ran the CIA.

“It worked better when the DCI [had the role]. He knew the analysts that produced the papers,” says Mr Lowenthal, who was assistant DCI for analysis.

…

But is there an argument that – in the absence of major bomb attacks – US intelligence is actually performing fairly well?

“We have been very successful,” says Mr Lowenthal. “The fact they are attacking in ones is a sign of success. The unspoken standard is perfection.”

“Lawyers, experts say Obama should boost Intelligence director’s power,” by Susan Crabtree, The Hill (5/25/10)

Mark Lowenthal, an intelligence veteran, views Blair’s departure as a wake-up call. “We can’t tinker around the edges anymore,” he said. “I think it’s time for a brutally honest conversation about whether the job is working — not just make marginal fixes and try to muddle through.”

“Blair’s Exit Raises Questions About Intelligence Job,” by Tom Gjelten, National Public Radio (5/21/2010)

“The job is not built for success,” said Mark Lowenthal, who was staff director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

“You’ve had three high-powered, highly intelligent individuals in that job, and you’ve had three of them in five years, and now we’re about to have a fourth one? That strongly suggests there’s something wrong with that job,” said Lowenthal, who also served as an assistant director of central intelligence and vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council. “The DNI is given a great deal of responsibility and very little authority to make it happen.”

“Move to Enhance Spy Chief’s Clout,” by Siobhan Gorman, The Wall Street Journal (5/22/2010)

Mark Lowenthal, a former senior intelligence official, said the directors of national intelligence to date are “three of the smartest men I ever had to work with or for.” If none have been able to make it work, he said, “you have to begin to ask yourself why the job doesn’t function well.”

“After Blair, the question is asked:  ‘Is it the job?’” by Greg Miller and Walter Pincus, The Washington Post (5/22/2010)

“The DNI doesn’t have any authority to make things happen,” said Mark M. Lowenthal, a former senior CIA official and the chief executive of the Intelligence & Security Academy. “If you look at who we’ve had, we’ve been extremely lucky in the people who’ve accepted the job. Three of the brightest people I’ve ever met. But they can’t make the job work. At a certain point, you have to ask yourself: Is it the job?”

“Dispute Over France Was Factor in Intelligence Rift,” by Scott Shane, The New York Times (5/22/2010)

Mark M. Lowenthal, a former assistant director of the C.I.A., said the relative weakness of the intelligence director position was especially frustrating to Mr. Blair, who had powerful positions in the military, notably as head of United States Pacific Command.

“Denny had been commander of the largest military command in the world,” Mr. Lowenthal said. “And then he took this job where anyone who wanted to ignore him basically could do it.”

“A Year of Terror Plots, Through a Second Prism,” by Scott Shane, The New York Times (1/13/2010)

But even that near miss, said Mark M. Lowenthal, assistant director of the Central Intelligence Agency for analysis from 2002 to 2005, may offer indirect evidence of the enemy’s diminished strength, compared with the coordinated attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

“Sending one guy on one plane is a huge step down,” Mr. Lowenthal said. “They’re less capable, even if they’re still lethal. They’re not able to carry out the intense planning they once did.”

“Let’s not become our own worst enemy,” Mark Lowenthal, McClatchy (1/15/2010)

Everyone should take a deep breath and stop flapping about the “failure” to identify Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab as a likely terrorist. What went wrong — and what’s gone right?

Yes, there were disparate pieces of information that — if they were put together correctly and on time — might have sounded an alarm about Abdulmutallab before he got on Northwest Flight 253 in Amsterdam. Were they, however, of sufficient magnitude to force agencies to focus on him? One of the many misconceptions swirling around this incident is the nature of intelligence analysis, and especially analysis about potential terrorists.

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“La première crise du renseignement du président Obama,” by Mark M. Lowenthal, Le Figaro (10/10/2010)

Le Président Obama continue d’avoir une relation décidément ambivalente avec le renseignement américain. La dernière preuve en est le langage extrêmement rude qu’il a employé pour décrire la façon dont le renseignement a « échoué » dans le partage de ses informations, en permettant à Umar Abdulmutallab d’embarquer à bord d’un avion à destination des États-Unis.

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“Making Them Talk,” by Tim Starks, Congressional Quarterly (10/01/2010)

“You could triple the size of the NCTC and still have the same problem,” said Mark Lowenthal, who served as vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council from 2002 to 2005. “We’re in a war. I don’t want to sound cold about this, but casualties occur in wars. The idea that you can fight a campaign and never suffer consequences is delusory.”